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1

Introduction

Digital Platform Economy has been aired for its efficiency, innovativeness, and
disruption of the markets. In this article we discuss the relationship of platforms
such as Uber and their national equivalents with the limitations of physical
infrastructure and markets. Our article pinpoints that even though the platforms
may hold their promise this may not be what the communities need, want or can
sustain.
We illustrate the unprecedented side-effects of the disruption on the markets
with Uber in Metropoles of the U.S. The side effects include doubts on safety,
unfair pay and worsening working conditions, as well as congestion and pollution
on streets. There after we analyze changing taxi markets in Finland.
The potential remedies to situations where new platform businesses threaten to
disturb the markets range from privatization of assets, regulative mechanisms to
local agreements (Ostrom, 1990).
This paper is structured as follows: First, we describe the benefits and arising
concerns of platforms as experiences on their unforeseen effects are
accumulating. In the next chapter we use the alternative theories to explain how
to tackle the problems of externalities, socially undesirable behavior and
overgrazing the common resources. In Chapter 4, we illustrate the situation with
Ubers at New York and other metropoles in U.S. In Chapter 5 we analyze the impacts of
opening of taxi market in Finland. The paper ends with discussion and
conclusions in Chapter 6.
2

Benefits, complexity and concerns of platforms

Amazon, Facebook, Airbnb, Lyft and Uber are examples of digital platforms
which have changed the way we work, socialize, create, and share value in the
economy (Kenney & Zysman, 2016; Sundararajan, 2016). These digital
platforms, defined here as sociotechnical assemblage of the technology,
associated organisational processes and standards (de Reuver et al., 2018), have
been praised for their new innovative business models that may even disrupt the
current markets and create more consumer surplus with their innovative,
technology-based business models facilitating multi-sided markets.
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Multi-sided market is the core concept of platforms. Often the platforms match
different groups of users, such as buyers and sellers, and can differentiate them
for capturing better profits, growth prospects, and providing superior or costeffective service for the customer. Instead of focusing on profit maximisation in a single
market, platform owner’s business model primarily aims at serving several user
groups and tries to find balance between openness and lock-in of customers
(Ballon & Van Heesvelde, 2011). The customer markets can be defined as
separate markets for each customer group, or as single market to all customer
groups with different set of products and services. To estimate the benefits to
one party using the platform, the platform owner must consider the benefits
(increase in efficiency and profit) on both sides of the market, i.e. towards the
customers and partners/suppliers/producers. This is at the core of the
superiority claims of platforms such as Uber and Airbnb.
Network externality is another important concept related to platforms. Positive
network externalities mean that the larger number of users on the platform, the
higher is the perceived or expected utility from using the platform (Katz &
Shapiro, 1985). This fosters growth and innovation, but complicates the analysis
of competitive markets, because the utility can vary substantially between the
segments, depending on their valuation of the expected benefits in the future.
Even though the public discussion many times is about which of the platforms
will win and dominate the markets, in reality the combination of multi-sided
markets and positive network effects with risk-seeking venture capital can create
situations where competitive, oligopolistic and monopolistic markets exist
simultaneously. In addition, predicting the emergent side effects on the
environment and vice versa (i.e., indirect externalities), and the dominant market
structure becomes then almost impossible. It can lead towards tipping markets,
where one platform dominates the market, either by indirect network effects of
interdependencies of different customer and supplier groups, or by crosssubvention of the sub-markets by the platform. On the other hand, it can also
lead to so-called multi-homing behavior, where customers are not connected with
one platform of multi-sided markets only, but use other platforms, too.
The literature on platforms also points out the regulatory role of platforms, as
they create markets of their own. Boudreau and Hagiu (2009), for instance, show
by case examples, how setting the prices was not enough to assure proper
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functioning of the multisided platform ecosystem, but required regulation of
access and interactions by contractual, technical and informational instruments.
3

Governance of Commons

Many of the problems explained in the Chapter 2 stem from self-interested
behavior, negative externalities or from the changes on the use of resources,
which the platforms exploit or affect in their business.
The solution usually offered to avoid negative externalities is privatization (Buck,
1992). We could make clear the property rights and liabilities by making the
resources private. It is claimed that if one party can establish the property right,
there will be a bargaining process leading to an agreement in which externalities
are taken into account. Thereafter it is a matter of finding proper balance of
regulation of markets and introduction of pricing.
However, in certain circumstances the above solution is not working, but rather
creating the tragedy of the commons. tragedy of the commons is illustrated with an
example originating from Hardin (1968): There is a common village pasture,
which can support only a limited amount of cattle, but all the villagers are entitled
to pasture their animals on the field. Each villager benefits from his own animals
and suffers from the deterioration of the commons when his and others' cattle
overgraze. In this situation each of them is tempted to add more and more
animals because he is getting direct benefit from his own animals and bears only
a share of the costs resulting from overgrazing.
The tragedy of commons is apparent in situations, where property rights cannot
easily be established (such as with the air, sea, or roads). The usual claim is that
rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common interests,
unless the number of individuals is small or unless there is aforementioned
enforcement of regulation taking place. The premise for such situations is that
any person, who cannot be excluded from obtaining the benefits of a collective
good has little incentive to contribute to the joint effort, but to free-ride on the
effort of the others for self-interest. An extensive literature discusses the effect
of free riders, concluding that common pool resources would inevitably be
destroyed because of lack of care (Buck, 1992). To avoid such tragedies of the
commons the central governments should control common pools of resources

J. Heikkilä & M. Heikkilä:
Global service platforms in local markets: case taxi services

885

that cannot be appropriated (e.g. most natural resource systems). They can
intervene in directly through taxes, or directly with controls and regulations, such
as selling permits, licenses or limiting the use of the common resource pool.
Nobel-prize laureate Ostrom (1990), suggests an alternative solution to govern
the commons. Continuing the example of the common village pasture, she notes
that the herders, who use the same meadow year after year, have detailed and
relatively accurate information about carrying capacity. Thus, they should have
the best information required for making optimal decisions on the usage of the
common pasture. The community members can “make a binding contract to commit
themselves to a cooperative strategy that they themselves will work out.” And, when they are
herding their animals, they can observe the behavior of others and report
contractual infractions.
The outcome of this is in strike contrast with the idea of self-interested behavior
regulated by central authority: “groups are capable of avoiding the tragedy of the commons
without requiring top-down regulation” (Ostrom 1990, 2009). Ostrom’s main argument
is that small, local communities establish rules overtime to avoid overusing
common resources. Instead, these rules are both economically and ecologically
sustainable, at least if core conditions listed in Table 1 are met (Ostrom 1990,
2009).
Table 1. Eight core design principles by Ostrom, 2009

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Clearly defined boundaries; members know that they belong to a group and why
do they belong exactly to that group, and what are the limits of the common resource.
Proportional equivalence between benefits and costs; there is a connection
between earnings and effort, e.g., appropriation of rents is not enough.
Collective choice arrangements; i.e., agreements must be reached in consensus by
those affected by the agreements.
Monitoring users and condition of the resource; Harmful self-interested, selfserving behavior can be detected.
Graduated sanctions; Repeated self-serving appropriators are assessed graduated
sanctions according to seriousness and context of the violation by group members,
or by officials accountable to these appropriators, or by both.
Fast and fair conflict resolution; Conflicts can be handled without excessive costs,
locally, and without internal conflicts breaking the group.
Local autonomy; The group is autonomous to manage its own matters without
external authorities intervening.
Nested enterprises: When the resource is closely connected to a larger socialecological system, governance activities are organized in multiple nested layers.
(Ostrom, 2009)
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In conclusion, the literature proposes three remedies for the challenges arising
from non- functioning markets: privatization, regulation or local commitment.
How is this then related with platforms? As the platforms are keen to disrupt
markets, they exploit the common pool of resources without considering
overgrazing or indirect negative externalities. Furthermore, they are also keen to
expand, fueled by venture capital and IT, which means unprecedented spread of
the services to the new areas, ‘overgrazing’ the local resource pools, and causing
tragedies of commons. This is evident in metropole areas, where the increase of
Airbnb is regulated by city councils. Similar challenges are with Uber and Lyft
due to the increasing evidence on their unanticipated indirect external effects on
congestion, pollution and diminishing use of public transportation (Erhardt et al,
2019).
As suggested by the theorists above, the outcome can be highly unpredictable,
and hence other approaches than the standard means of regulation and
introduction of pricing mechanisms are in need. This is especially true, when it
involves the threat of overgrazing common pool resources, or changing the
status quo of locally agreed and locally committed social arrangements. We
illustrate the former with examples from metropoles in the U.S. and the latter
from the deregulation of Finnish taxi markets.
4

Illustrative example of Taxi services in Metropoles of the U.S.

The success story of Uber platform tells about better access to taxi services, both
in terms of availability of services and average decline in prices. For instance,
safety and similarity are appreciated by globetrotters, who receive similar service
in cities all over the world, and safety for the drivers is appreciated in some areas.
In Uber, each driver is expected to own a car used to render the service and the
drivers are not employed by Uber, but the drivers get paid per gig. There is no
centralized dispatch service-center, but service requests are automatically
processed by Uber’s algorithm; drivers can use their smart phones to receive and
respond the service requests from users by an app. This application also allows
customers to place orders through it, which also locates customers automatically
for the driver. Furthermore, customers can follow in real time the location of the
ordered driver such that they know when to expect the car to arrive. Payment is

J. Heikkilä & M. Heikkilä:
Global service platforms in local markets: case taxi services

887

handled automatically through the smart phone app at the end of the ride, when
also customers rate the service publicly with the application.
Impacts to markets are easily seen for instance in the New York: There are
officially black taxis (limousine and premium for corporate customers), green and
yellow taxi cabs (midrange, street hailed), and small livery companies for hire
vehicles, which carry less than 10% of paid trips in Metropolitan New York. Uber
services and other similar platforms offering ride services (PRS) have disrupted
the prevalent market segmentation by changing pricing and increasing prearranged rides. As a consequence, the supply has increased, and segments are
overlapping, thus in general meeting better user needs for transportation.
The new entrants have gained big market shares quickly. Figures vary, but Uber’s
market share of the US ride-hailing market is between 69% and 74% (Iqbal,
2018). For instance, in New York PRS now outnumber yellow taxis four to one
(Wodinsky, 2018).
However, there are several negative impacts as well: The studies reveal that PRS
has added billions of miles of driving in the largest metro areas in the US at the
same time that car ownership grew more rapidly than the population (Schaller,
2018). Uber taxis actually use more mileage per trip, because they have to pick
up the customer. And they prefer not to park but to drive around, because
parking is expensive. Thus, 20-50 percent of miles are without passengers (Law,
2018). Importantly, PRS actually compete mainly with public transportation,
walking and biking. In major U.S. cities, the popularity of FHV has “reduced the
use of buses by 6% and light rail by 3%” (c.f. Law, 2018). Thus, it seems that the
increased supply has lured people to switch from public transport to taxis making
limited street space congested. These findings are confirmed in another
assessment of the effects of uberization in San Francisco; it found that contrary
to the vision of PRS, it is actually the biggest contributor to growing traffic
congestion in San Francisco (Erhardt et al, 2019).
In 2018, two years after entry of the PRS, New York decided for limitations (New
York City, 2016). The license’s duration was shortened to 12 months, driver
minimum wage and minimum fare price was introduced, number of PRS cars
cannot grow, but in wheel-chair -accessible category, or where PRS service is in
short supply (Wodinsky, 2018). Still, the taxi drivers consider not to be part of
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the deal and there has been recently strikes due to worsening income by drivers
(Rapier, 2019).
One could also argue that it is a matter of time, when the markets will find the
right balance between regulatory measures, pricing, demand and supply, but, for
example Uber has been operating in San Francisco since 2010, and in New York
since 2011, so the explanation is neither credible, or feasible. Hence there is a
need for better, more local approaches, such as the one proposed by Ostrom’s
design principles.
5

Analysis of taxi services in Finland

In Finland, taxi markets have been highly regulated, authorities admitting taxi
licenses on regional needs basis. However, the authority in charge of regulation,
Finnish Ministry of traffic and communications, informed in Autumn 2016 that
taxi business is to be deregulated. The expectation was that deregulation would
result in more taxis, better service, cheaper prices and more taxable income for
traffic investments. Since Autumn 2018, there is no more regulation on the
amount of taxi cars, the taxi licenses are national (instead of regional), official
requirements on vocational competence and local knowledge are omitted
(passing a simplified test is sufficient), and pricing is liberated.
The Ministry is following the effects of the deregulation on taxi markets with
surveys, which form the main data source for our analysis. The Ministry
anticipated that the main effects are the opening of the taxi business to new
entrants and boost in innovation in transportation services. This came true: there
are new entrants and the total number of taxi-licenses grew in Finland: In Feb
2019, there are 2762 (29%) taxi licenses more on the market (of total 12249
licenses) than at the end of the regulation in the Summer of 2018. Consequently,
the taxes paid by taxis should have increased. However, the most recent statistics
shows opposite results – the taxes paid by taxis actually decreased by one third
from the previous three years according to the tax authorities – this discrepancy
is expected to be due to tax evasion (Konttinen, 2019).
However, a more detailed analysis reveals that the regional differences are
significant – the increase of licenses takes place in the big cities. Uber is operating
only in the capital area in Finland. As cities are becoming dominated by
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international taxi company subsidiaries, they are turning to oligopolistic leaderfollower pricing: the price of taxi service increased by over 20% in the biggest
cities. At the same time, sparsely populated areas suffer from increasing lack of
taxi service, and this is causing severe problems for example to elderly countryside residents. The complaints about non-profitable business has increased (in
public discussion a 25% decrease of income is regularly reported, with an
increasing workload).

Figure 1. Taxi markets in Finland

After deregulation, the market changed as depicted in Figure 1. There are now
clearly several distinctive markets for Taxis in Finland:
1. Business customers and private customers, who can negotiate the price
when reserving transportation. The market has turned to an oligopolistic
supplier markets in bigger cities, where a few international taxi companies
dominate the market share and have been able to raise the price level
recently. Typical price reduction of negotiating the price at the spot (taxi
post) is -25% from the list price. On the other hand, during rush hours,
or late-night hours the price can be many times the list price. In sparsely
populated areas the situation varies. Small one car-one driver companies
are not obliged to be on call, which means that the cars are not available
as before, or at all. Bigger companies have no interest for the
insignificant market.
2. School and daycare transportations are allocated through competitive
biddings by municipalities. The prices are pushed down by combining
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rides for the elderly and school kids. Typical winners are taxi companies
of bigger size, who can guarantee regular, daily service. The market
consists of multiple monopsony-oligopoly structures.
3. Subsidized KELA-transports 1, where a sole client determines a ceiling
price and saves costs by requiring combined transports with minimum
number of passengers. On the other hand, taxi centers act as proxies for
small and big taxi companies and they are inspected by authorities for
the quality of service. The political pressure for price reduction
continues. Market has switched from pure monopsony to monopsonyoligopolistic structure. Half years after deregulation the studies show how
service level and availability has deteriorated significantly in the special
customer segment, such as elderly and people with wheel-chair.
In summary, the liberation of taxi markets has not moved towards perfectly
competitive taxi market, but it has led to the growth of internationally funded big
fleets of taxi companies, who can utilize the economies of scale. It is now clearly
oligopolistic markets for private customers, and the previous oligopsonies
(municipalities and KELA) are facing oligopolies in their negotiations (instead of
association of taxi drivers). This is in line with the theory predicting tipping and
unpredictable markets in an uncontrollable manner.
The outcome in densely populated areas is better availability, but lesser
profitability for taxi drivers, because the big companies were able to exert
predatory pricing in the beginning and later increasing prices. The prices rose
+14% in the capital area and +7 % in the whole country. At the same time there
are some hints for slightly diminishing use of other public transportation like
buses, trams, trains and metro in bigger cities. However, in sparsely populated
areas the capacity reduction in taxi services is clear, and in some places, there are
no taxi service, as the drivers quitted or sold their companies to big players.
So, there are major problems with service quality, price levels, competitive
bidding and obviously tax evasion – by the public, the taxi liberation is considered
a failure, and the differences between market segments is significant. Majority of
regular customers and subsidized specialty customer groups feel that the effects
of deregulations are negative (Uusitalo et al., 2019). Hence there is also a need
1

In Finland you can get reimbursement for your travel costs in connection with the treatment of an illness.
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for alternative, probably market segment specific, more local solutions, as the
central government is not capable to meet the objectives of the deregulation. One
attempt for Ostromian solution is explained below.
Local adaptation of deregulated taxi service - ATaxi
We also analyzed in more detail the reactions of one incumbent taxi service
provider, a taxi drivers’ co-operative ATaxi, which had operated over hundred
years in Northern Finland. With its high standards ATaxi had created over the
years locally well-known brand image of quality, credibility and safety. It served
customers in the rather sparsely populated region with a fleet of 600 cars
equipped with proprietary technology that enabled the drivers to receive and
accept orders and accept debit/credit payments among the first in the world.
Customers could order ATaxi by calling centralized call-center, which forwarded
request to nearest drivers, the fastest of whom then took the order, previously
via radio, later via the mobile Internet. In practice, before deregulation, the ATaxi
had a monopoly position in the local market for almost a century – the situation
was basically the same in other regions in Finland. Legal consultants helped
ATaxi to evaluate the kind of changes they can make, not abusing its significant
market powers, which ATaxi still possess. ATaxi realized that its competitive
edge was that it offers reliable, safe, and high-quality taxi services. In order to be
able to keep this value proposition, the company balanced the number of cars to
serve the market well and still provide sufficient earnings to the drivers. Thus,
instead of competing with price, it aggregated regional taxi data and estimated
the number of taxis required to meet its service proposition. The rules of ATaxi
membership, including rules for determining the number of drivers were agreed
and put openly available from their web pages. These rules are revisited
biannually, or whenever members see it necessary. In addition, the co-operative
saw as a necessity to introduce new brand, and new channels through which the
customers can identify, order and interact with the service.
6

Discussion and conclusion

This paper discusses the side effects of platform economy: the unanticipated
consequences and indirect externalities. The two identified unexpected effects
on the community, based on theory and accumulating experiences of platforms
in taxi business are the overgrazing of common resource pool and unanticipated
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changes of the market structure. The former is illustrated with an of Uber in the
U.S., where uberlike platforms’ indirectly diminishes use of public transportation,
and consequently increase environmental pollution and congestion. The latter
case is illustrated with taxi services in Finland, where deregulation of taxi services
changed the market structure significantly and failed to meet the set targets of
the change. However, a regional taxi company operating in Northern Finland
designed a local solution for deregulated markets, that was able to maintain the
present quality of service without deteriorating the income of taxi companies and
prices.
Next, we discuss the three cases: Uber, Finnish taxi deregulation and the countermeasures to the deregulation by ATaxi against the backdrop of Ostrom’s Core
Design Principles for groups capable of avoiding the tragedy of the commons by:
Clearly defined boundaries; members know that they belong to a group and why do
they belong exactly to that group, and what are the limits of the common resource.
Taxi drivers formed a professional community, and license system set
geographical limits to the common resources: space and customer base.
Uber in N.Y.C and deregulation threatened the status quo and served as
an incentive to limit the overgrazing of street space (N.Y.C).The limited
customer base of ATaxi in Northern Finland, who nurtured their
professionalism despite the regulation in a limited geographical area and
are (so far) able to avoid the complications of changing market structure
elsewhere in Finland
10. Proportional equivalence between benefits and costs; there is a connection between
earnings and effort, e.g., appropriation of rents is not enough. Disruption of the
market and falling profits (N.Y.C), or threat of future decline (ATaxi)
created an incentive to re-regulate the market by the community, so that
the drivers can earn a living from their profession. This actually was the
boost to renew the rules for ATaxi which returned the balance between
earning and effort. In metropoles of the U.S. the taxi drivers started
demonstrating, because of unfair share of income.
11. Collective choice arrangements; i.e., agreements must be reached in consensus by those
affected by the agreements. Taxi drivers’ unions were formerly negotiating for
different markets in N.Y.C (black, green, yellow, livery markets); or
serving all market segments in Finland (private, business, subsidized
rides) with obligation to being on call and providing service in sparsely
9.
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populated regions. As the markets were deregulated, the consensus
disappeared. Sparsely populated areas are suffering from no-access to
taxi services and in N.Y.C., there was no respect to the upper limit of
taxi cars, which drove the prices down and congested the streets. ATaxi
maintained the on-call responsibility.
Monitoring users and condition of the resource; Harmful self-interested, self-serving
behavior can be detected. As the agreed use of common resource could not
be, or was not allowed to be monitored, due to liberalization of terms of
conditions, the situation promoted self-interested and self-serving
behavior. In essence, the negative externalities (for drivers non-sufficient
wages), and negative indirect externalities (congestion in N.Y.C, lack of
service in sparsely populated areas, oligopoly price-hikes in densely
populated areas) could be detected only afterwards, leading to
unintended consequences. The local communities responded by reregulating the market, or by establishing mutual consensus agreements
and self-monitoring and -reporting by rules (see also 3. and 5.) and
applications available to the customers, too. However, in Finland there
is evidence of increasing tax evasion beyond the control of tax office.
Graduated sanctions; Repeated self-serving appropriators are assessed graduated
sanctions according to seriousness and context of the violation by group members, or
by officials accountable to these appropriators, or by both. It appears that both the
platforms (N.Y.C.) and deregulation set centrally strict sanctions for the
drivers. This differs from the past where sanctions were graduated,
proportional, and maintained by the community, which is still the case
with ATaxi.
Fast and fair conflict resolution; Conflicts can be handled without excessive costs,
locally, and without internal conflicts breaking the group. Disappearance of taxi
inspectors in Finland has led to situations, in e.g. big events, where there
is no impartial authority over all taxi drivers for queuing, unloading, etc.,
or reconciliating non-satisfactory service, or pricing has lead to fist fights
for customer in waiting areas (TS xxx), which lead to local conciliation
between taxi companies and municipality. The conflict resolution by the
authorities is simply too slow and non-proportional demoralizing the
profession.
Local autonomy; The group is autonomous to manage its own matters without
external authorities intervening. Platforms and authorities have moved in the
territory of self-regulated drivers and companies, with un-intended
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consequences on availability (in restless areas of N.Y.C.; sparsely
populated areas in Finland), quality of service (subsidized rides in
Finland), and on pricing (greater Helsinki area in Finland, rush-hours in
N.Y.C). The central authorities are not able to solve the problems in our
cases despite their attempts.
16. Nested enterprises: When the resource is closely connected to a larger social-ecological
system, governance activities are organized in multiple nested layers. There is an
indication that ways to enhance the situation is not by redistributing the
resources (N.Y.C., Cities in Finland), or by pushing for harder
competition and setting price ceilings in competitive bidding in
subsidized rides in Finland. Instead, the parties should come together
and acknowledge the limitations of market mechanisms and utilize
platforms and re-regulation to give a try the Ostrom Core Design
Principles to avoid over grazing of common-resources, or distortions on
the distinct markets. This remains to be seen.
The examples in previous chapters show how the taxi services quality and supply
increased in big cities, but on the other hand caused overgrazing of common
resources, the street areas. Therefore, In US the communities were soon forced
to restrain Uber by establishing new rules regarding number of cars and length
of license periods. In Finland, the deregulation of the markets in the whole
country did not work as anticipated by liberators. The emergent properties were
many and hard to predict. Instead of perfect markets, the market was divided in
several distinctive markets: the markets in big cities concentrated and is now
dominated by international players. There are now more taxi cars driving around
in the cities, but contrary to expectations, the prices rise. In special customer
segments and sparsely populated areas the quality reduction in service level is
clear. As a response to the above a local ATaxi community in a limited
geographical area established rules to balance the number of taxi cars to serve
the market well and still provide sufficient earnings to the drivers. Ministry is
currently evaluating impacts of the deregulation in Finland and might be forced
to take actions similar to New York and set restrictions to the taxi service
markets, or alternatively, allow the local communities to establish their own rules
for guaranteeing available, safe, and reliable taxi rides.
In the illustrative cases it becomes evident that there are no simple solutions, but
the solutions are actually adaptations to the dynamic situations, which are hard
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to meet by the standard means of privatization, i.e., by appropriating resources
and introducing pricing mechanisms, Assuming multi-sided perfectly
competitive markets is not true in the markets that can vary from monopsonies
of customers to oligopolies of big taxi companies, or call centers, operating on
limited common resources in terms of space or population.. This is further
complicated, if the common pool resources are not taken into account.
Nevertheless, the avoidance of the tragedy of the comments builds on social
norms and characteristics of the community and adapting the platforms to their
situations on an on-going basis.
More sensitive solutions to the situation could be provided by alternative
approaches such as Ostrom’s Core Design Principles. Combined with the power
of multisided markets, it could be worth trying to achieve sustainable and better
suited markets for the needs of the segments, both producers, aggregators and
customers.
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